Tag Archives: Shia Islam

#Islam: Why Sunnis Fear Shiites

Hillel Fradkin & Lewis Libby

The recent Arab revolts in the Middle East and the concomitant “Islamic Awakening” have not merely shaken up the order of an already violent and unstable region. They have reanimated the bloodiest and longest-running dispute in Muslim politics: which branch of Islam, Sunni or Shia, is to rule the Muslim polity. This rivalry dates back some 1,300 years to the death of Muhammad, and while it has occasionally been set aside for reasons of expedience, it has never been resolved. The continuing conflagrations following the mislabeled Arab Spring, increasingly shaped by this ancient Sunni–Shia tension, are set to rage on indefinitely. Affairs in the Middle East are accelerating back to the old normal: a state of hot holy war.The seemingly internal conflict in Syria has become the war’s central front. Sunni and Shia alike have been drawn into the conflict as the Syrian tragedy has unfolded. Inspired by the revolts in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, in March 2011 Syrians—a predominantly Sunni population—mounted initially peaceful protests against the rule of the Shia-offshoot Alawite regime headed by Bashar al-Assad. Secure in his support from the extremist Iranian regime, Assad responded with great brutality. His opponents responded in kind, fueled by money and arms from their Sunni patrons in the Gulf Arab states and by Sunni Islamists from both the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda. They fear what they have taken to calling, with alarm, the “Shia crescent.” The term connotes a swath of Iranian Shiite influence across the Arab world and, via Syria, to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Syria functions as Iran’s direct operational link to its terrorist arm Hezbollah and to the Shiite plurality in Lebanon. It borders Iraq, whose Shiite majority may be radicalized, and Turkey, whose Sunni leadership can be monitored and checked.

As the Syrian revolt proceeded, sectarian elements came to the fore. The momentum frequently shifted back and forth between the Iranian-backed Assad and the Sunni rebels. But this past spring, when Assad’s fortunes waned, Iran doubled down. It arranged for Shiite Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite “volunteers” to join the fray directly and massively, tipping the battle for Syria into Shiite hands. Iran is now winning what one Iranian officer has described as “an epic battle for Shiite Islam.”

As this has gone on, the willful retraction of American influence in the region has fanned both Iranian ambitions and Sunni fears. The Middle East is well versed in the posturings and weaknesses of foreign sovereigns. In Shiite and Sunni eyes alike, President Barack Obama’s proposed deals relating to Syrian chemical weapons and Iran’s nuclear program translate into large gains for radical Shiism.

It is tempting, naturally, for Americans to stay out of a fight between two holy armies who oppose the United States and its allies. To put it very mildly, neither radical Shiite nor radical Sunni groups share our values or serve our interests. Still, as a practical matter, this does not mean that one of our enemies is not a more potent threat than the other. Of all the distasteful regimes in the region, only Iran’s has defined itself from its foundation as our mortal enemy and acted accordingly ever since. Moreover, Iran’s capacity to pursue hostile action toward America is currently growing. Thus, Iran presents the more serious threat to our well-being. If it emerges the victor in the fight for the future of political Islam and regional dominance, American interests will probably be endangered to an extent not seen since the Cold War. This is especially true if an Iranian victory is coupled with the regime’s attainment of a nuclear weapon. Not only will America’s ally Israel be under constant threat of annihilation, but American influence in the Middle East will be made hostage to credible Iranian policy blackmail. And yet, given the current status of the Sunni–Shia conflict, this is where we’re headed. “Iran grows more powerful day by day,” Iranian President Hassan Rouhani recently gloated. It’s hard to disagree.

There are several reasons for thinking that radical Shiism, as manifested in the Iranian regime, might continue to dominate and ultimately win this holy war. First, the Shiite camp enjoys the advantage of the more-or-less unitary leadership of Iran. Perhaps in time internal Iranian opposition could challenge the regime in Tehran, but for now the ayatollahs seem to have stifled any such efforts. Outside Iran, some Shiite clerics in Iraq reject the Khomeinist doctrine of the “Rule of the Jurisprudent,” but this “quietist” school of Shiism is not interested in governing its Persian neighbors and, in any case, is frequently undermined by other clerics working in Iraq on Iran’s behalf. So the concentrated center of Shiite power remains in Iran and is, moreover, strengthened by the support of outside non-Muslim powers—principally Russia and China.

By contrast, the Sunni camp is profoundly divided, and therefore weak. This weakness is manifest in the split among the Sunni Islamist forces fighting Assad in Syria. The result is increasingly frequent military fights between sides, to say nothing of the ongoing fights with more secular Sunni militias.

Beyond Syria, things are scarcely more cohesive for Sunnis. The Sunni nations of Arabia and the Gulf lack the size and reach of Iran. They have provided money and arms to the Sunni rebels fighting Assad, but as they themselves support different Islamist groups inside Syria, they’ve also contributed to the infighting. What’s more, the broader conflicts among these countries have derailed joint efforts.

The unsettled condition of Sunni-majority Egypt, the world’s largest Arab country, has had a demoralizing and divisive effect as well. While ousted Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi had suggested that Egypt might provide greater support for the Syrian opposition, that proposal proved so unpopular it might very well have been a contributing factor in his removal by the Egyptian military. The new regime has made clear that it wants no part of the Syrian civil war.

Perhaps the most surprising of the Sunnis’ weak links is Turkey. The country shares a long border with Syria and is therefore on the frontline of the struggle. In recent years, its prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had put forward claims to not only Sunni leadership but regional leadership as well. After Turkey declared its enmity for Assad, it was reasonable to expect it to take a significant, even decisive, role in the struggle. After all, Turkey is equal in size to Iran and in possession of a large modern army. And under Erdogan’s rule, underwritten by three successive electoral victories, Turkey had enjoyed unprecedented economic prosperity and political stability. As a result of this and Erdogan’s Islamist roots and leanings, Turkey appeared to enjoy great prestige within Arab countries, especially those where Islamist forces were coming to the fore. The Brotherhood movements held Turkey in high regard.

Yet over the two years since Erdogan declared that Assad must step down, he’s done little to make that happen. Additionally, he’s begun to face his own domestic legitimacy crisis; there have now been several large protests against Erdogan’s mode of rule. Among the many objections fueling the protests was Erdogan’s Syria policy, which was deemed by some to be too aggressive and risky for Turkey. Meanwhile, Erdogan’s weakness has been further exposed by his failure to garner any regional leader’s support in his continuing campaign against the ouster of Egypt’s Morsi. Erdogan went out on a limb, and no one followed. Within the constellation of Sunni countries—Arab and non-Arab—no one has a claim on leadership, least of all Turkey, the most powerful among them.

Yet another contribution to Sunni disarray is the lack of a credible, external non-Muslim patron—namely, the United States. In the past, America had de facto supported Sunni interests, but Obama is not following that path. After making pronouncements about the necessary departure of Assad, he gave very little material support to the opposition. And then, after more such pronouncements, he conveyed the expectation that Assad will survive with diminished control over Syrian territory. Last came Obama’s big Syrian debacle: The administration announced plans for a small attack aimed only at Syria’s chemical-weapons capabilities—before embracing a Russian proposal that would allow Assad to avoid even that.

The American retreat from a Syria strike follows on the heels of Obama’s abandoning a U.S. military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, which would have weighed on Iranian calculations. In all this, Washington has ensured a powerful impression of weakness. If America is so reluctant to act in the face of Assad’s clear provocation, so ready to abandon its positions, both Sunnis and Shiites are likely to conclude that the United States does not have the stomach for the contests to come with Iran, including the matter of the supposedly ambiguous Iranian nuclear program. Tellingly, a top adviser to Erdogan (whom Obama had assiduously courted) recently described the American president as a “half leader.” Russian President Vladimir Putin, Erdogan’s aide proclaimed, is a “whole leader.” And this was before Putin’s diplomacy rescued Obama from action in Syria.


Though there are few prospects for true Sunni success in Syria (or the larger sectarian war), there are possible scenarios in which Sunnis can regain some ground lost to Shiites. But even these eventualities offer limited hope of doing serious damage to Iran. For example, the civil war might allow the Syrian rebels to carve out a mini-state in what was once greater Syria. Such an area would probably be governed by the Jihadist groups most hostile to the Shiites. One of those groups, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, would undoubtedly try to combine Sunni areas of Iraq with a Sunni-controlled Syrian area. This mini-state would be a frontline base for continuing the fight against Shiites. But Iran has demonstrated a fierce devotion to its aims, and its willingness to expend treasure and blood will not lapse even if its ally has lost partial control of his dominion.

In any event, Iranian nuclear weapons are likely to push Sunni powers toward greater and greater accommodation to Iran’s will (to be, so to speak, “Finlandized”). Consider just one important Sunni country, and American ally, Saudi Arabia. In recent years, Iran has tried to raise the price of oil by getting the Saudis to limit its production. So far, the Saudis have shot down these requests, but they may not feel free to do so if Iran possesses a nuclear bomb (and especially if Russia—which has its own interest in high prices—joins Iran in applying pressure). Even if Saudi Arabia were to obtain its own nuclear deterrent, Iran’s more ideologically radical foreign policy would render any Saudi attempt at brinkmanship a very bad option.


Current Sunni–Shiite polemics often invoke an earlier period of large scale Sunni–Shiite warfare: the rivalry between the Sunni Ottoman Caliphate and the Shiite Safavid Persian empire, which ran its course in the 16th and 17th centuries. In that struggle the powerful resources of the Ottoman state kept Safavid power in check relatively easily. As a result Sunnis may be heartened by its recollection.

But there was another time when the Muslim world was in a predicament perhaps still more similar to the one it faces today. In the 10th and 11th centuries, the radical Shiite regime known as the Fatimids, based in Egypt and acting in sometime alliance with a Shiite dynasty ruling in Baghdad, dominated the Middle East and the Sunnis. The Shia were able to attain power in large part because the Sunnis were divided. Ultimately the Sunnis did reemerge as the dominant force, but that required a new Sunni element from outside the region—the Seljuk Turks.

There is no such Sunni equivalent to the Seljuk Turks today, but non-Islamic external powers could still play a countervailing role. Thus far, the Obama administration has declined to do so, arguing implicitly that developments in Syria have made decisive American action a risky prospect. This is no doubt true, even if present costs and risks are the result of previous American inaction.

Are we then obliged to see Iran emerge victorious and proceed onward in its regional designs? There is another option. The most obvious possibility is to shift our focus to areas where Iran is more vulnerable to American might: its nuclear program and its disaffected heartland. But here, too, there is little reason for hope. The record of American pronouncements against an Iranian bomb is becoming murkier as it gets longer. The same can be said of American calls for Iranian democracy. As matters now stand, the United States is still pursuing a negotiated settlement with Tehran on the nuclear issue—a process that has, in truth, been pursued for 10 years with nothing to show for it. Iran’s new president, Rouhani, has taken to speaking in the soft and vague diplomatic terms that hopeful Westerners describe as moderate. Obama-administration diplomats seem to be fully on board with this reading of matters. But as a senior adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has noted of Rouhani: “The language is and should be different; but the goal remains the same.” Indeed, Rouhani’s pre-presidential career is an anthology of the kind of anti-American apocalyptic oratory that no hopeful American diplomat should mistake for moderation.

The most effective option for stopping Iran’s march to regional dominance would be the judicious application of military force. Nobody but President Obama can know for sure if the United States will exercise that option, but the recent record of American retrenchment and accommodation makes it ever more doubtful.

But if the United States determines that striking Iran is, like striking Syria, not worth the risk, there is one last possibility: Israel. The Jewish state, which faces an existential threat from Iran, may take military action to halt the mullahs’ nuclear program. The Israelis are an improbable stand-in for the Seljuk Turks, yet as Mark Twain famously said, “History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” It is a rhyme, moreover, that seems plausible enough to a number of Sunni Gulf-Arab leaders who have privately confided their support for an Israeli strike on Iran. If such a strike were to occur and be successful, it might initiate a positive change in the trajectory of the Sunni–Shiite war by reversing the fortunes of today’s Fatimids.

About the Authors

Hillel Fradkin is senior fellow at Hudson Institute, where Lewis Libby serves as senior vice president.

#Lebanon: Hezbollah preparing for internal confrontation

Hezbollah has given orders for the “general mobilization” of its fighters in Lebanon and the reactivation of the Resistance Brigades, a paramilitary group loyal to the Shiite party, NOW quoted Kuwaiti daily As-Seyassah as reporting onThursday.

“Hezbollah’s decision to announce the general mobilization is an indication that it is preparing a certain plan that it would implement inside Lebanon, and also probably along the Syrian-Lebanese border,” the As-Seyassah quoted sources as saying.

“The party took the decision recently without making it public, following the attacks which have targeted it as a result of its participation in the Syrian war,” the As-Seyassah sources also said.

While pointing out that Hezbollah had only once previously announced the general mobilization of its fighters, in 1996 during the Israeli military operation of “Grapes of Wrath,” the sources added that the Shiite group “was not discounting the possibility of an all-out battle in Arsal, as the upcoming battle in Yabroud in Syria could lead to the transfer of thousands of Jihadi fighters to Arsal [in North Lebanon].”

The report also voiced concern of a possible “snowball” effect, whereby Lebanese and Palestinian groups in North and South Lebanon, as well as Beirut, would move against Hezbollah in the context of a wider Sunni-Shiite confrontation.

“That is why [Hezbollah] ordered the reactivation of the work of the Resistance Brigades, so it can be available in any potential internal confrontation.”

“The [Shiite] party is on the verge of declaring war on any Lebanese group connected to the Jihadi groups in Syria,” the sources added.

After Hezbollah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah warned that groups in Qalamoun have been dispatching explosive-laden cars to Lebanon, a car bomb detonated near a Hezbollah position outside the town of Labwe, in the Beqaa Valley, in the early hours of Tuesday morning.

The bomb detonated after a checkpoint manned by Hezbollah members intercepted the car, before opening fire on it, Lebanon’s state National News Agency reported.

The blast occurred to the east of Syria’s Qalamoun border region, where Bashar al-Assad regime forces and Hezbollah fighters have battled Syrian rebels since mid-November.

Shiite-populated areas across Lebanon have been the target of terror attacks since Hezbollah declared it was fighting on the side of the Syrian regime in May.

Three car bomb attacks have targeted southern Beirut in recent months, while a number of IED attacks have occurred in Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley.


The Most Deadly Middle East Conflict: Shia vs.Sunni Islam

The Shi’ite-Sunni conflict is the most deadly and unsolvable conflict in the MIddle East and it is between Muslims. It is, for example, the basis for the great hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Dr. Mordechai Kedar

This week, on the tenth of the month of Muharram, the first month of the Hijri calendar, is Ashura, which at first was akin to the Jewish Day of Atonement, Yom Kippur, occurring on a similar date. However, over the years, this day has become a memorial day for Hussein bin Ali, leader of the Shi’ite sect, who was executed by the army of the Sunni regime in southern Iraq in the year 680 CE, 1333 years ago.

He was decapitated and his head was ceremoniously brought to Damascus as proof that the deed had been carried out. Caliph Yazid bin Muawiyah placed Hussein’s head on his table and left it there for a month, so that all could see the fate that befalls a rebel and would be deterred from behaving as he did.

The fact that Hussein was the grandson of Mohammad the prophet of Islam did not prevent the caliph from treating Hussein’s head in this manner.

What is the cause of the Shi’ite-Sunni conflict? Why the terrible cruelty that has been characteristic of this conflict even until today?

The story begins in the year 632, the moment that Muhammad died. Immediately upon his death the struggle began over who would succeed to the most powerful position in Islam – the office of Caliph, Muhammad’s replacement and the leader of Islam.

Ali bin Abi Talib was Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, since he was married to Fatima, daughter of Allah’s messenger and his first wife, Hadija. Fatima bore to Ali two sons, Hasan and Hussein, and two daughters – Zainab and Umm Kulthum.

While Muhammad was still alive, his daughter Fatima quarreled with Aisha, Muhammad’s last wife, who was younger than Fatima by several years. After Muhammad’s death, Aisha’s father, Abu Bakr, was appointed as the leader of Islam, which was against Fatima’s wishes, who saw her husband Ali as the natural successor to Muhammad, since he was Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, as well as the father of Muhammad’s grandchildren.

There were severe struggles among the group of people that surrounded the first three caliphs, Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman because of the family feud over who would inherit the leadership.

Ali was eventually appointed as the fourth caliph in the year 656 after his predecessor, Uthman, was murdered. Those who opposed Ali, principally members of the Umayyah family, accused him of being involved in the murder of Uthman and during all five years that he ruled, he had to fight his adversaries continually.

The governor of Syria, Muawiya, rose up and pronounced himself caliph. His son, Yazid, was the caliph who gave the instructions to murder Hussein bin Ali.

The murder of Hussein occurred in Southern Iraq, near the city of Karbala. He was murdered together with several dozens of his friends and family members, with only one baby surviving to continue the dynasty. The murder, which occurred in 680 – remains the defining event for “Shi’at Ali”, the “sect of Ali”, which is the source of the name “Shia” or Shi’ite, the name of the stream of Islam that supports the leadership of Ali’s descendants.

This family conflict has been ongoing for almost 1400 years. Until the year 1258, with the fall of Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid dynasty, all of the caliphs of Islam for over six hundred years were from Muhammad’s tribe, the tribe of Quraysh, but they were never the descendants of Ali. This situation placed Shi’a in continual opposition to the ruling regime and they became a harshly persecuted group throughout the history of Islam.

The struggle between the two groups has led to the development of great differences between the two in every area of religious life: religious laws are different, the theology is different, and even the basic scriptures are different: The Shi’ites claim that the Sunnis omitted two chapters from the Qur’an where the leadership was promised to Ali and his descendants, while the Sunnis claim that these two chapters were fabricated by the Shi’ites. The oral law is also different, because each side invented stories about Muhammad to support their political position.

In their prayers, the Shi’ites curse the first three caliphs for stealing the rule from Ali, and they add passages that praise and exalt Ali. Therefore there are many among the Sunnis, especially the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, who consider Shi’a as a kind of fundamental heresy. The Saudi regime forbids the Shi’ite minority to recite the call to prayer aloud, because even in the muezzin’s call to prayer there is an extra part praising Ali.

The Shi’ites commemorate the Ashura – a memorial day for the murder of Hussein bin Ali – with very impressive events of “ta’aziah” (consolation). In some places they march in the streets and beat their backs with knives and chains even to the point of drawing blood, and in other places they meet to recite laments, weeping and wailing. All of these events carry a harsh anti-Sunni message, which perpetuates the hostility between the two groups of Islam.

Shi’ites are persecuted in every Islamic country where they do not rule: Saddam Hussein forbade the Shi’ites to commemorate Ashura, and on that day, Shi’ites were forbidden to gather in the streets. Any group of more than three Shi’ites that was caught in public on this day was sent to prison.

In Lebanon, the Shi’ites were a marginal, oppressed and degraded group. This provided the social background for the development of Hizb’Allah (Hezbollah, on Google), which eventually took control of Lebanon in revenge for hundreds of years of oppression and marginalization.

In one of the Arab villages in northern Israel, a number of families changed over to the Shi’ite side of Islam after Hezbollah’s “divine victory” in 2006, and as a result, these families have been banned: their youth were expelled from the schools and the stores in the village were closed to them.

A few months ago in Egypt, a leader of the small Shi’ite sect was slaughtered together with several of his aides, and in Europe there are mosques that have been built with Saudi money on condition that Shi’ites will not be permitted to enter their gates.

Iran’s behavior totally fits with the history of the battle between Shi’a and Sunna: the Iranian, Shi’ite Ayatollahs’ sweetest dream is to control Mecca and Medina, so that they can throw the Sunni Wahhabis out of these Islamic holy places, and restore the Shi’ites, the descendants of Ali, the fourth caliph, to power.

This is the basis for the great hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the sense of a great and real threat that Saudi Arabia feels these days because of the Iranian military nuclear project.

Israel is a punching bag for both streams of Islam: the Sunnis see Jerusalem as the third holiest place in Islam as a result of the political problems of the seventh century, when the House of Umayyah, which ruled in Damascus, adopted Jerusalem as the religious and political center to compete with Mecca.

The Shi’ites – traditionally – did not see Jerusalem as a holy place, because it had been “sanctified” by the House of Umayyah, the despised murderers of Hussein bin Ali.

But in modern politics, both sides compete against each other in the struggle for religious legitimacy, because each side wants to present itself as the better jihad fighter against the Jews. Thus, Jerusalem is “holy” to the Shi’ites too: Iran established the “Quds” force (“Quds” is “holy” in Arabic, and part of the Arabic name for Jerusalem: al-Quds) to spread terror throughout the world, and every year Hezbollah organizes “Jerusalem Day” in conjunction with the Iranians.

But the ongoing political wars between Sunna and Shi’a still cause many thousands of deaths: the eight year war (1980-1988) between Iraq, which was then ruled by the Sunni Saddam Hussein, and Iran of the Shi’ite Ayatollahs, resulted in well over a million deaths on both sides, all of whom were Muslims who were killed by other Muslims.

Since 2003, Iraq has returned to sectarian war as Sunni jihadists blow up car bombs and truck bombs in Shi’ite neighborhoods, and in revenge, Shi’ites blow up vehicles loaded with explosives in Sunnis areas. This front has cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of men, women and children until now.

Shi’ite commemorative events such as the Ashura (which occurs this week) and the fortieth day afterward, are “special favorites” of Sunni terror operatives, because the mass processions and large gatherings of Shi’ites in ta’aziah rituals make an attractive and effective target for anyone who is interested in harming Shi’ites. In a number of past events it was enough for a rumor to be spread that a terrorist had entered the Shi’ite crowd to cause a stampede causing hundreds of people to fall from bridges and be trampled to death.

There are groups of Shi’ites in Pakistan and Afghanistan as well. The members of these groups are considered to be unclean and Shi’ite mosques in these cities are a regular target for terror attacks by radical Sunnis, especially members of al-Qaeda.

In the past, there have been attempts to mediate and reconcile the two streams of Islam, but the all-out war being conducted in Syria for the past three years has shuffled all the cards, because in this country too, supported by Iranian weapons, monies and Shi’ite fighters, the Alawite, “infidel regime” has been ceaselessly slaughtering its Sunni citizens, and has caused the death of about two hundred thousand citizens and has made refugees of millions of people, who are living a life of suffering and misery.

Ali and Muawiya, the fourth and fifth caliphs from the middle of the seventh century, have been in their graves for some time, but the struggle between them for the rule of Islam continues to claim casualties among their supporters and adherents, who are all, every single one, Muslims.

Dr. Mordechai Kedar (Mordechai.Kedar@biu.ac.il) is an Israeli scholar of Arabic and Islam, a lecturer at Bar-Ilan University and the director of the Center for the Study of the Middle East and Islam (under formation), Bar Ilan University, Israel. He specializes in Islamic ideology and movements, the political discourse of Arab countries, the Arabic mass media, and the Syrian domestic arena.

Translated from Hebrew by SallyZahav with permission from the author. First published in the Hebrew weekly Makor Rishon. Copyright – Original materials copyright (c) by the author.

Additional articles by Dr. Kedar