[Congressional Bills 113th Congress] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office] [S. Res. 65 Introduced in Senate (IS)] 113th CONGRESS 1st Session S. RES. 65 Strongly supporting the full implementation of United States and international sanctions on Iran and urging the President to continue to strengthen enforcement of sanctions legislation. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES February 28, 2013 Mr. Graham (for himself, Mr. Menendez, Ms. Ayotte, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Cornyn, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Casey, Mr. Hoeven, Mrs. Gillibrand, Mr. Kirk, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Cardin, Ms. Collins, Mr. Begich, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Brown, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Portman, Mr. Manchin, and Mr. Lautenberg) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations _______________________________________________________________________ RESOLUTION Strongly supporting the full implementation of United States and international sanctions on Iran and urging the President to continue to strengthen enforcement of sanctions legislation. Whereas, on May 14, 1948, the people of Israel proclaimed the establishment of the sovereign and independent State of Israel; Whereas, on March 28, 1949, the United States Government recognized the establishment of the new State of Israel and established full diplomatic relations; Whereas, since its establishment nearly 65 years ago, the modern State of Israel has rebuilt a nation, forged a new and dynamic democratic society, and created a thriving economic, political, cultural, and intellectual life despite the heavy costs of war, terrorism, and unjustified diplomatic and economic boycotts against the people of Israel; Whereas the people of Israel have established a vibrant, pluralistic, democratic political system, including freedom of speech, association, and religion; a vigorously free press; free, fair, and open elections; the rule of law; a fully independent judiciary; and other democratic principles and practices; Whereas, since the 1979 revolution in Iran, the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran have repeatedly made threats against the existence of the State of Israel and sponsored acts of terrorism and violence against its citizens; Whereas, on October 27, 2005, President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for a world without America and Zionism; Whereas, in February 2012, Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei said of Israel, “The Zionist regime is a true cancer tumor on this region that should be cut off. And it definitely will be cut off.”; Whereas, in August 2012, Supreme Leader Khamenei said of Israel, “This bogus and fake Zionist outgrowth will disappear off the landscape of geography.”; Whereas, in August 2012, President Ahmadinejad said that “in the new Middle East . . . there will be no trace of the American presence and the Zionists”; Whereas the Department of State has designated the Islamic Republic of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984 and has characterized the Islamic Republic of Iran as the “most active state sponsor of terrorism” in the world; Whereas the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has provided weapons, training, funding, and direction to terrorist groups, including Hamas, Hizballah, and Shiite militias in Iraq that are responsible for the murder of hundreds of United States service members and innocent civilians; Whereas the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has provided weapons, training, and funding to the regime of Bashar al Assad that has been used to suppress and murder its own people; Whereas, since at least the late 1980s, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has engaged in a sustained and well-documented pattern of illicit and deceptive activities to acquire a nuclear weapons capability; Whereas, since September 2005, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has found the Islamic Republic of Iran to be in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which Iran is obligated to undertake as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (NPT); Whereas the United Nations Security Council has adopted multiple resolutions since 2006 demanding of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran its full and sustained suspension of all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and its full cooperation with the IAEA on all outstanding issues related to its nuclear activities, particularly those concerning the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program; Whereas the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has refused to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions or to fully cooperate with the IAEA; Whereas, in November 2011, the IAEA Director General issued a report that documented “serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme,” and affirmed that information available to the IAEA indicates that “Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device” and that some activities may be ongoing; Whereas the Government of Iran stands in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for denying its citizens basic freedoms, including the freedoms of expression, religion, peaceful assembly and movement, and for flagrantly abusing the rights of minorities and women; Whereas in his State of the Union Address on January 24, 2012, President Barack Obama stated, “Let there be no doubt: America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to achieve that goal.”; Whereas Congress has passed and the President has signed into law legislation imposing significant economic and diplomatic sanctions on Iran to encourage the Government of Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and end its support for terrorism; Whereas these sanctions, while having significant effect, have yet to persuade Iran to abandon its illicit pursuits and comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions; Whereas more stringent enforcement of sanctions legislation, including elements targeting oil exports and access to foreign exchange, could still lead the Government of Iran to change course; Whereas, in his State of the Union Address on February 12, 2013, President Obama reiterated, “The leaders of Iran must recognize that now is the time for a diplomatic solution, because a coalition stands united in demanding that they meet their obligations. And we will do what is necessary to prevent them from getting a nuclear weapon.”; Whereas, on March 4, 2012, President Obama stated, “Iran’s leaders should understand that I do not have a policy of containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.”; Whereas, on October 22, 2012, President Obama said of Iran, “The clock is ticking . . . And we’re going to make sure that if they do not meet the demands of the international community, then we are going to take all options necessary to make sure they don’t have a nuclear weapon.”; Whereas, on May 19, 2011, President Obama stated, “Every state has the right to self-defense, and Israel must be able to defend itself, by itself, against any threat.”; Whereas, on September 21, 2011, President Obama stated, “America’s commitment to Israel’s security is unshakeable. Our friendship with Israel is deep and enduring.”; Whereas, on March 4, 2012, President Obama stated, “And whenever an effort is made to delegitimize the state of Israel, my administration has opposed them. So there should not be a shred of doubt by now: when the chips are down, I have Israel’s back.”; Whereas, on October 22, 2012, President Obama stated, “Israel is a true friend. And if Israel is attacked, America will stand with Israel. I’ve made that clear throughout my presidency . . . I will stand with Israel if they are attacked.”; Whereas, in December 2012, 74 United States Senators wrote to President Obama “As you begin your second term as President, we ask you to reiterate your readiness to take military action against Iran if it continues its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon. In addition, we urge you to work with our European and Middle Eastern allies to demonstrate to the Iranians that a credible and capable multilateral coalition exists that would support a military strike if, in the end, this is unfortunately necessary.”; and Whereas the United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-150) stated that it is United States policy to support Israel’s inherent right to self-defense: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, SECTION 1. SENSE OF CONGRESS. Congress– (1) reaffirms the special bonds of friendship and cooperation that have existed between the United States and the State of Israel for more than sixty years and that enjoy overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress and among the people of the United States; (2) strongly supports the close military, intelligence, and security cooperation that President Obama has pursued with Israel and urges this cooperation to continue and deepen; (3) deplores and condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the reprehensible statements and policies of the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran threatening the security and existence of Israel; (4) recognizes the tremendous threat posed to the United States, the West, and Israel by the Government of Iran’s continuing pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability; (5) reiterates that the policy of the United States is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon capability and to take such action as may be necessary to implement this policy; (6) reaffirms its strong support for the full implementation of United States and international sanctions on Iran and urges the President to continue and strengthen enforcement of sanctions legislation; (7) declares that the United States has a vital national interest in, and unbreakable commitment to, ensuring the existence, survival, and security of the State of Israel, and reaffirms United States support for Israel’s right to self- defense; and (8) urges that, if the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in self-defense, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence. SEC. 2. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as an authorization for the use of force or a declaration of war.
1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).
2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions are binding on Iran. The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are mandatory, in accordance with the terms of those resolutions.
3. By virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations,5 the Agency is required to cooperate with the Security Council in the exercise of the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. All Member States of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council, and in this respect, to take actions which
are consistent with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.
4. This report addresses developments since the last report (GOV/2012/23, 25 May 2012), as well as issues of longer standing. It focuses on those areas where Iran has not fully implemented its binding obligations, as the full implementation of these obligations is needed to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
B. Clarification of Unresolved Issues
5. As previously reported, on 18 November 2011 the Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2011/69 in which, inter alia, it stressed that it was essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding those issues, including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran. In that resolution, the Board also called on Iran to engage seriously and without preconditions in talks aimed at restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. In light of this, the Agency and Iranian officials held talks in Tehran and Vienna, during which a structured approach to the clarification of all outstanding issues was discussed, focusing on the issues outlined in the Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report and the Agency’s request for access to the Parchin site. Issues related to the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations, other than those included in the Annex to the November 2011 report, were to be addressed separately. During the talks in Vienna on 14 and 15 May 2012, Iran stated that access to the Parchin site would not be possible before agreement had been reached on a structured approach.
6. As also previously reported, on 21 May 2012 the Director General held meetings with senior Iranian officials in Tehran to discuss issues of mutual interest. Although some differences between Iran and the Agency on the document resulting from the talks on 14 and 15 May 2012 remained, H.E.
Mr Saeed Jalili, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, made clear during a meeting with the Director General that these were not obstacles to reaching agreement on a structured approach.
7. Further talks between the Agency and Iranian officials were held in Vienna on 8 June 2012 and 24 August 2012 with a view to finalizing the structured approach, based on the document resulting from the talks in May 2012. However, important differences remain and no agreement could be reached on the structured approach.
8. Despite the intensified dialogue between the Agency and Iran since January 2012, efforts to resolve all outstanding substantive issues have achieved no concrete results: Iran, in an initial declaration, simply dismissed the Agency’s concerns in connection with the issues identified in Section C of the Annex to GOV/2011/65; Iran has not responded to the Agency’s initial questions on
Parchin and the foreign expert; Iran has not provided the Agency with access to the location within the Parchin site to which the Agency has requested access; and Iran has been conducting activities at that location that will significantly hamper the Agency’s ability to conduct effective verification. Notwithstanding Mr Jalili’s statement referred to above, agreement on the structured approach has yet
C. Facilities Declared under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement
9. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 16 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant
resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared material at these facilities and LOFs
D. Enrichment Related Activities
10. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities in the declared facilities referred to below. All of these activities are under Agency safeguards, and all of the nuclear material, installed cascades and the feed
and withdrawal stations at those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.
11. Iran has stated that the purpose of enriching UF6 up to 5% U-235 is the production of fuel for its nuclear facilities13 and that the purpose of enriching UF6 up to 20% U-235 is the manufacture of fuel for research reactors.
12. Since Iran began enriching uranium at its declared facilities, it has produced at those facilities approximately:
• 6876 kg (+679 kg since the previous report) of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235
• 189.4 kg (+43.8 kg since the previous report) of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235
D.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plan
13. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP): FEP is a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU) enriched up to 5% U-235, which was first brought into operation in 2007. The plant is divided into Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to design information submitted by Iran, eight units are planned for Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit. No
detailed design information has yet been provided for Production Hall B.
14. As of 21 August 2012, Iran had fully installed 55 cascades in Production Hall A, of which 54 were declared by Iran as being fed with natural UF6,15 and partially installed one other cascade. Preparatory installation work had been completed for another 34 cascades, and was ongoing in relation
to 54 others. All the centrifuges installed in Production Hall A are IR-1 machines. During a design information verification (DIV) on 11 August 2012, the Agency noted that Iran had started general preparatory work in Production Hall B. In a letter dated 23 August 2012, the Agency requested that Iran provide an updated DIQ for FEP including information for Production Hall B.
15. As previously reported,16 the Agency has verified that, as of 16 October 2011, 55 683 kg of natural UF6 had been fed into the cascades since production began in February 2007, and a total of 4871 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 had been produced. Iran has estimated that, between 17 October 2011 and 6 August 2012, a total of 23 698 kg of natural UF6 was fed into the cascades and
a total of approximately 2005 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 had been produced, which would result in a total production of 6876 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 since production began.
16. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February 2007 and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.
17. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP): PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility, and a pilot LEU production facility, which was first brought into operation in October 2003. It has a cascade hall that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated for the production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area designated for R&D
(Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).
18. Production area: As of 21 August 2012, Iran was feeding low enriched UF6 into two interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6).
19. As previously reported,18 the Agency has verified that, as of 13 September 2011, 720.8 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 produced at FEP had been fed into the cascades in the production area since production began in February 2010, and that a total of 73.7 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 had
been produced. Iran has estimated that, between 14 September 2011 and 21 August 2012, a total of 364 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 at FEP was fed into the cascades in the production area and that approximately 50.4 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced. This would result in a
total production of 124.1 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 at PFEP since production began.
20. R&D area: Since the previous report, Iran has been intermittently feeding natural UF6 into IR- 2m and IR-4 centrifuges, sometimes into single machines and sometimes into small or larger cascades. Iran has yet to install three new types of centrifuge (IR-5, IR-6 and IR-6s) as it had indicated it intends
to do. Iran has also been intermittently feeding one cascade with depleted UF6 instead of natural UF6.
21. Between 19 May 2012 and 21 August 2012, a total of approximately 3.4 kg of natural UF6 and 20.3 kg of depleted UF6 was fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails were recombined at the end of the process.
22. Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP20 and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.
D.2. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
23. The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) is, according to the DIQ of 18 January 2012,21 a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 and the production of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235. Additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this
facility, particularly in light of the difference between the original stated purpose of the facility and the purpose for which it is now being used.22 The facility, which was first brought into operation in 2011, is being built to contain 16 cascades, equally divided between Unit 1 and Unit 2, with a total of
approximately 3000 centrifuges.23 To date, all of the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines.
24. As of 18 August 2012, Iran had installed all eight cascades in Unit 2, four of which (configured in two sets of two interconnected cascades) it was feeding with UF6 enriched to 3.5% U-235. In Unit 1, Iran had completely installed four cascades and partially installed a fifth cascade, none of which it was feeding with UF6.
25. Iran has estimated that, between 14 December 2011, when feeding of the first set of two interconnected cascades began, and 12 August 2012, a total of 482 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 was fed into cascades at FFEP, and that approximately 65.3 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 were
produced, 50 kg of which has been withdrawn from the process and verified by the Agency.
26. With regard to the presence of particles with enrichment levels above 20% U-235,24 Iran’s explanation is not inconsistent with the further assessment made by the Agency since the previous report.25 The Agency and Iran have exchanged views on ways to avoid a recurrence of transient enrichment levels above the level stated in the DIQ.
D.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities
27. The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided.26 Iran
has not provided information, as requested by the Agency, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology.27 As a result of Iran’s lack of cooperation on those issues, the Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.
E. Reprocessing Activities
28. Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.28 In a letter to the Agency dated 15 February 2008, Iran stated that it “does not have reprocessing activities”. In that context, the Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)29 and the
Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.30 The Agency carried out an inspection and DIV at TRR on 6 August 2012, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 8 August 2012. It is only with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access that
the Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran.
F. Heavy Water Related Projects
29. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor at Arak, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor), which is
under Agency safeguards.
30. On 1 August 2012, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed that, as part of the facility’s ongoing construction, cooling and moderator circuit piping was being installed. As previously reported, Iran has stated that the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is due to commence in the third quarter of 2013.32
31. Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency has not been provided with further access to the plant. As a result, the Agency is again relying on satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on recent images, the plant appears to be in operation.
To date, Iran has not permitted the Agency to take samples from the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF).
G. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication
32. Although it is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects, Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF, the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) and the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) at Esfahan, as indicated below, which are in contravention of those obligations, although the facilities are under Agency safeguards. Iran has stated that it is
conducting these activities in order to make fuel for research reactors.
33. According to the latest information available to the Agency, Iran has produced:
• at UCF: 550 tonnes of natural UF6, 91 tonnes of which has been sent to FEP; and
• at FMP and FPFP: seven fuel items containing uranium enriched up to 20% U-235, two fuel items containing uranium enriched to 3.34% U-235 and five fuel items containing natural uranium.
34. Uranium Conversion Facility: Between 5 and 9 March 2012, the Agency carried out a physical inventory verification (PIV) at UCF, the results of which are now being evaluated by the Agency. As previously reported, the Agency has verified that Iran produced 24 kg of uranium in the form of UO2
during R&D activities involving the conversion of UF6 enriched up to 3.34% U-235 into UO2, and that 13.6 kg of uranium in the form of UO2 was subsequently transferred to FMP.35 As of 10 August 2012, Iran had resumed these R&D activities, but had not produced additional uranium in the form of UO2. As of the same date, Iran, through the conversion of uranium ore concentrate (UOC), had produced about 3340 kg of natural uranium in the form of UO2, of which the Agency has verified that Iran transferred 1272 kg to FMP .
35. On 22 April 2012, Iran introduced into the UCF process area 25 drums containing approximately 6560 kg of domestically produced UOC, and 25 drums containing approximately 9180 kg of UOC taken from Iran’s stockpile of imported UOC.36 Iran has mixed together the UOC from these 50 drums
and used it for the production of natural UO2.
36. Fuel Manufacturing Plant: On 22 August 2012, the Agency carried out a DIV and an inspection at FMP and confirmed that the manufacture of pellets for the IR-40 Reactor using natural UO2 was ongoing. While Iran was continuing to manufacture dummy fuel assemblies for the IR-40 Reactor,37 it was not manufacturing fuel assemblies containing nuclear material.
37. Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant: As previously reported,38 Iran has combined into one facility the activities involving the conversion of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8 and the manufacture of fuel assemblies made of fuel plates containing U3O8. Between the start of conversion activities on 17 December 2011 and 12 August 2012, Iran has fed into the process 71.25 kg of UF6 enriched up to
20% U-235 and produced 31.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235 in the form of U3O8.
H. Possible Military Dimensions
38. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.39 Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of
undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.
39. The Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency, indicating that Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information, which comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency’s own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that, prior to the end of 2003 the activities took place under a
structured programme; that some continued after 2003; and that some may still be ongoing. Since November 2011, the Agency has obtained more information which further corroborates the analysis
contained in the aforementioned Annex.
40. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran’s obligations to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, including by providing
access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.40 In its resolution GOV/2011/69 of 18 November 2011, the Board of Governors, inter alia, expressed its deep and increasing concern about the unresolved issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme,
including those which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions.
41. Parchin: As stated in the Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report,41 information provided to the Agency by Member States indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. The information also indicates that this vessel was installed at the Parchin site in 2000. The location at the Parchin site of the vessel
was only identified in March 2011. The Agency notified Iran of that location in January 2012.
42. Satellite imagery available to the Agency for the period from February 2005 to January 2012 shows virtually no activity at or near the building housing the containment vessel. However, since the Agency’s first request for access to this location, satellite imagery shows that extensive activities and resultant changes have taken place at this location. A number of satellite images of the location since February 2012 show: large amounts of liquid ‘run off’ emanating from the building in which the vessel is housed; equipment in open storage immediately outside the building; the removal of external fixtures from the building itself; and the presence of light and heavy vehicles. Satellite imagery shows that, as of May 2012, five other buildings or structures at the location had been demolished, and powerlines, fences and all paved roads had been removed. Significant ground scraping and landscaping have been undertaken over an extensive area at and around the location, with new dirt roads established. Satellite images from August 2012 show the containment vessel building shrouded. In light of these extensive activities, the Agency’s ability to verify the information on which its concerns are based has been adversely affected and, when the Agency gains access to the location, its ability to conduct effective verification will have been significantly hampered.
43. In a letter to the Agency dated 29 August 2012, Iran stated that the allegation of nuclear activities at the Parchin site is “baseless” and that “the recent activities claimed to be conducted in the vicinity
of the location of interest to the Agency, has nothing to do with specified location by the Agency”.
44. The activities observed and Iran’s letter of 29 August 2012 further strengthen the Agency’s assessment that it is necessary to have access to the location at Parchin without further delay.
I. Design Information
45. Contrary to its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, which provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases. Iran remains the only State
with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement that is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1. It is important to note that the absence of such early information reduces the time available for the Agency to plan the
necessary safeguards arrangements, especially for new facilities, and reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities.
46. Iran last provided the Agency with some updated information on the IR-40 Reactor in 2007, but has not provided a DIQ for the facility since 2006. Since 2007, Iran has conducted significant additional design and construction work on the reactor, but has not provided further information, as required pursuant to modified Code 3.1 of Iran’s Subsidiary Arrangements General Part. The lack of
up-to-date information on the IR-40 Reactor is now having an adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to effectively verify the design of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach. On 1 August 2012, the Agency conducted a survey of the site in order to identify which safeguards
equipment it would need to install at the IR-40 Reactor and where it should be located. Although Iran provided the Agency with some relevant technical details during that visit, it did not provide an updated DIQ.
47. As previously reported, Iran’s response to Agency requests that Iran confirm or provide further information regarding its stated intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it would provide the Agency with the required information in “due time” rather than as required by the modified Code 3.1
of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.
J. Additional Protocol
48. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol
K. Other Matters
49. As previously reported, the Agency found a discrepancy of 19.8 kg between the amount of nuclear material declared by the operator and that measured by the Agency in connection with conversion experiments carried out by Iran at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory
(JHL) between 1995 and 2002. Following further analysis and measurement of the relevant material by the Agency and evaluation of clarifications and corrections provided by Iran, the Agency has been able to reduce its initial estimate of the discrepancy. The Agency and Iran have agreed to conduct further analysis with a view to resolving the discrepancy.
50. In June 2012, Iran started using one of the fuel assemblies consisting of 19 fuel plates containing U3O8 enriched up to 20% U-235 as an integral part of the core of TRR. In August 2012, Iran also started using in the core of TRR one of the control fuel assemblies consisting of 14 fuel plates containing U3O8 enriched up to 20% U-235. Iran has also continued to use a fuel assembly containing
12 rods of UO2 enriched to 3.34% U-235 as one of the control assemblies in the core of TRR. On 9 July 2012, the Agency verified the receipt at TRR of one control fuel assembly containing 14 plates and two fuel rods containing natural UO2. As requested, Iran has provided the Agency with further information about the irradiation of nuclear material received from FMP, as well as the TRR
operator’s plans for irradiating such material.
51. As previously reported,48 according to Iran, commissioning activity at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) commenced on 31 January 2012. On 29 and 30 July 2012, the Agency conducted an inspection at BNPP while the reactor was operating at 75% of its nominal power.
52. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
53. Despite the intensified dialogue between the Agency and Iran since January 2012, no concrete results have been achieved in resolving the outstanding issues. Given the nature and extent of credible information available, the Agency considers it essential for Iran to engage with the Agency without
further delay on the substance of the Agency’s concerns. In the absence of such engagement, the Agency will not be able to resolve concerns about issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.
54. It is a matter of concern that the activities which have taken place since February 2012 at the location within the Parchin site to which the Agency has requested access will have an adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to undertake effective verification. The Agency reiterates its request for access to that location without further delay.
55. The Director General continues to urge Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and mandatory Security Council resolutions, to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, and to urge Iran to engage with
the Agency to achieve concrete results on all outstanding substantive issues.
56. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
It is difficult to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle in an Iran that has ambitions that involve not only the destruction of Israel and the expansion of its power in the Middle East, but its full emergence on the stage as a world power. I have read a number of respected military and political leaders, (such as Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey), state that “ the Iranian regime is a rational actor.” http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/17/watch-gps-martin-dempsey-on-syria-iran-and-china/ But I believe the question must be asked; If the leadership in Iran, (President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei), is organized to accomplish the goals identified above, how best will they achieve their mission? Is there a rational path to power and the obliteration of one’s opponents?
It appears that the desire of Iran to emerge from its identification as the epicenter for the dissemination of terror, its thirty year isolation and the increasingly crippling sanctions that have been/are being applied depend on its acquisition of the nuclear know-how to place its own counter demands on the region and the world. Iran watched Iraq threaten the region, invade Kuwait and participate in three wars including a long and costly war with Iran and ultimately contribute mightily to the overthrow of its own regime.
On December 14, 2001 moderate Iranian leader Hashemi-Rafsanjani made a speech that included a dire warning to Israel:
“If a day comes when the world of Islam is duly equipped with the arms Israel has in possession, the strategy of colonialism would face a stalemate because application of an atomic bomb would not leave any thing in Israel but the same thing would just produce damages in the Muslim world.”
In the same speech Rafsanjani went onto threaten the United States and Israel with the following words:
“War of the pious and martyrdom seeking forces against peaks of colonialism will be highly dangerous and might fan flames of the World War III.”
“Jews shall expect to be once again scattered and wandering around the globe the day when this appendix is extracted from the region and the Muslim world”, Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani warned, blaming on the United States and Britain the “creation of the fabricated entity” in the heart of Arab and Muslim world. http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2001/dec_2001/rafsanjani_nuke_threats_141201.htm
These words rang somewhat hollow a decade ago in the midst of the Second Intifada at a time when Israel, the United States and Western powers knew Iran’s atomic energy program was still in its infancy. But today according to a recent study by David Albright and Andrea Stricker for the United States Institute of Peace entitled; “Iran’s Nuclear Primer;”
“Iran has produced approximately 2,400 kg of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) as of May 2010, and 17 kg of 19.75 percent uranium as of June 2010 at Natanz. Iran continues to refine its ability to efficiently produce 19.75 percent enriched uranium and to expand its centrifuge efficiency, as well as the numbers in operation.
Iran has enough low enriched uranium (LEU) to produce about two nuclear weapons, if it decided to enrich the LEU up to weapon-grade.
Other undeclared enrichment sites may be under construction. Iran announced it will begin construction on the first of 10 new sites in March 2011. But Iran lacks the capability to outfit 10 enrichment sites.
A parallel nuclear program could be used for breakout. A secret enrichment site using diverted low enriched uranium from Natanz would require approximately 2,000 P-1 centrifuges to produce about 25 kilograms to 40 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium in one year. The upper bound would require the P-1 centrifuges to operate better than they currently do at Natanz. However, Iran is working to improve the P-1 centrifuges’operation and in parallel to develop more powerful, reliable centrifuges. Operating with 1,000 centrifuges, a covert enrichment site using P-1s could produce about 40-70 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium per year, starting with 20 percent enriched uranium.
A nuclear weapon test device could require less than 20 kg of weapon-grade uranium. A nuclear warhead for a missile may contain as much as 25 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium.” http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-nuclear-program,
It is clear that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak have done everything in their power to convince President Obama and the international community that it is serious in its willingness to launch a pre-emptive strike on the Iranian nuclear program in hopes that the international community will respond with a system of sanctions and other actions tough enough to inspire the Iranians to terminate their program and eliminate its nuclear material and capacity. All this has not moved the Iranians toward agreement in the P5 +1 talk this week in Baghdad. And to make matters worse and even more pressing the International Atomic Energy Association just announced that Iran is producing a higher level, 27%, of enriched uranium at its underground plant near Qom. http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5g_B4310rnMZXxogW9m4FEHRwh0Dw?docId=17f6df2bd8d644e0b682f8c1a7ffffd3
All this points to an Iranian desire to gain a “break out” capacity to produce weapons grade enriched uranium and join the Nuclear Club as a full member. Since Israel has sworn to prevent such an occurrence and has acted twice in the past, (at Osirak, Iraq in June 1981 and at al-Kibar Syria in September 2007), it is not unlikely that they will act once again by launching a pre-emptive strike against Iran before election day, (November 6, 2012), in the United States. Given the body of information above the question is whether Iranian leaders have calculated rationally that they can withstand a strike by Israel against their nuclear facilities and that such a strike would in fact create numerous allies from the regional and international community that they would not gain in the absence of surviving such an attack. In its aftermath and by carrying out a policy of limited warfare against Israel Iran would have a green light to rehabilitate its nuclear program and to develop into a major regional and international power with support from a variety of nuclear states.
The words here represent the beliefs of the author and should not be construed as the policy of the Interfaith Community for Middle East Peace.
- ‘Iran has enough uranium for 5 bombs’ (iranaware.com)
- The new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report (iranaware.com)
- 5 Nuclear Sites That Could Launch War With Iran (iranaware.com)