Category Archives: Afganistan

What Happened to ISIS’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Province?

The so-called Islamic State’s Khurasan province (ISIS-Khurasan), which includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, remains a notional entity a year after its establishment. It consists mainly of peripheral Afghan and Pakistani Taliban defectors who have fused with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and are clustered in remote portions of northeastern Afghanistan bordering Pakistan.

While ISIS-Khurasan has engaged in some high-profile attacks over the past year, it has lost a strategic window of opportunity to absorb local jihadist networks amid the fractious leadership transition following the announcement of the death of Afghan Taliban founder Mullah Muhammad Omar.

The loss of this opportunity is due to ISIS-Khurasan’s ideological inflexibility as well as efforts by a loose “consortium” – the U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani governments, and the Afghan Taliban, al-Qaeda, Pakistani Taliban, and Lashkar-e Taiba – to obstruct its rise.

Achievements

Presently, ISIS-Khurasan is concentrated in portions of Afghanistan’s remote, but strategically located Nangarhar province, whose capital, Jalalabad, lies along the most direct route between Peshawar, Pakistan and Kabul, Afghanistan. The Peshawar-Jalalabad-Kabul road was a critical supply route for the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan and a major artery for landlocked Afghanistan’s trade with the world.

In January, ISIS-Khurasan demonstrated an ability to extend beyond Nangarhar’s more remote areas and hit Jalalabad, the province’s major urban center. ISIS-Khurasan claimed responsibility for a January 13, 2016 attack on the Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad. Days later, a suicide bomber struck the home of a local anti-ISIS-Khurasan tribal leader in Jalalabad, killing over a dozen people. An Afghan Taliban spokesman said that his group was not involved in the blast, which makes ISIS-Khurasan a likelier suspect.

ISIS-Khurasan aims to consolidate and expand its presence in Nangarhar and move into neighboring Kunar and Nuristan. Militants loyal to the group also operate in other parts of the country, such as the Zabul province, where former IMU members now linked to ISIS-Khurasan have kidnapped and killed Hazara Shia Muslims numerous times.

While ISIS-Khurasan’s leadership comes largely from Pakistan, it lacks a safe haven in the country. Pakistan’s civilian government and military have the will and capability to confront the terror group. The emergence of ISIS-Khurasan came amid an overall decline in jihadist violence in Pakistan, propelled by a more forceful and comprehensive counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaign that began at the end of 2013. As a result, Pakistan has seen a precipitous drop in terrorist violence. Civilian deaths due to terrorism fell from a virtual all-time high of 3001 in 2013 to 1781 in 2014 and 940 in 2015 – roughly a 70 percent decline from its peak and the lowest number since 2006.

Still, ISIS-Khurasan appears to be in the midst of developing a network in urban Pakistan, as attacks attributed to the group as well as numerous arrests of alleged members indicate. What is unclear whether this embryotic network is the byproduct of active recruitment by figures connected to the ISIS core leadership in Syria or are these militants are moving toward ISIS on their own.

ISIS-Khurasan has yet to show that it can pull off attacks in Pakistan with the scale, regularity, and sophistication of competing militant groups. Last month, it took responsibility for a grenade attack on ARY News, a private Pakistani news channel that has taken a heavily pro-army stance in recent years (mainly in respect to tensions with the civilian leadership).

The deadliest operation attributed to ISIS-Khurasan was a mass shooting in Karachi targeting a bus carrying members of the Ismaili Shia Muslim community. All together, 46 people were killed in the attack on May 13, 2015. Hafiz Saeed Khan, the ISIS-Khurasan’s leader, took responsibility for the attack in an interview published in January in the group’s magazine, Dabiq.

Pakistani security officials have alternated between describing the killers as connected to al-Qaeda or ISIS. In October, a police official in Karachi said that the group received direction from an ISIS figure in Syria, who, by virtue of his name, appears to be a Pakistani national. Yet other officials quoted later describe the network as connected to al-Qaeda, though the group did not claim responsibility for the attack. It may be that they were self-directed and either operate in a gray zone between al-Qaeda and ISIS, or have shifted allegiance from the former to the later.

If ISIS is to make an impact in Pakistan, the path may be through low-cost, high-impact urban terrorism (e.g., mass shootings), rather than a grueling insurgency focused on control of remote terrain. Ominously, ISIS has been attracting middle-class, educated, urban Pakistanis – albeit in small numbers.

Saad Aziz, the main perpetrator of the mass shooting of Ismaili Shias, was a graduate of one of Pakistan’s top business schools. Adil Masood Butt, the alleged funder of the attack was a former member of Islamist group Tanzeem-i Islami who studied at Indiana University, and had been tied to Pakistani al-Qaeda operatives, such as Akmal Waheed.

Pakistani security forces have arrested dozens of suspected ISIS members and sympathizers elsewhere in the country, including former members of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), which is seen as a front group for Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT). And a small number of Pakistanis, including women, have gone to Syria to support ISIS.

What these arrests mean remains unclear. More likely, they reflect the vigilance of Pakistan’s crackdown on an embryonic network rather than ISIS’s rising tide in the country.

Beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan, ISIS has claimed responsibility for a string of attacks in Bangladesh, including the bombing of an Ahmadi Muslim mosque, attacks on two Shia mosques, and the killing of an Italian aid worker. These attacks largely blend into killings of agnostics, atheists, and foreigners by al-Qaeda-linked terrorists, and do little to build the ISIS brand in Bangladesh.

Indian officials have arrested dozens of alleged ISIS sympathizers, including individuals in Karnataka and elsewhere once part of the Indian Mujahideen/Ansar al-Tawhid network that has been absorbed by ISIS. Not only do these ISIS-linked cells appear to be small in size, they also lose members to Iraq and Syria, where several have died in fighting.

ISIS-Khurasan Outmaneuvered

In the aforementioned interview in Dabiq, ISIS-Khurasan’s leader Hafiz Saeed Khan smugly dismissed the presence of both al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban in the region, and is scornful of the oath of allegiance of the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to the new Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour.

While al-Qaeda is a shadow of its former self in South Asia, the Afghan Taliban, which is arguably ISIS-Khurasan’s main competitor in the region, is ascendant. Mullah Akhtar Mansour has consolidated control over the group. His most influential detractors have shown little interest in joining ISIS-Khurasan. Similarly, the TTP, despite its fracturing, has chosen to stay, at least nominally, in Mansour’s camp – though there may be tactical, covert cooperation between elements within the TTP network and ISIS-Khurasan. Should peace talks with Kabul bring about opposition to Mansour, Taliban dissidents are likely to operate autonomously of ISIS-Khurasan, not under its leadership.

As it stands, ISIS-Khurasan is more spectator than spoiler in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban is contesting for control over key areas in Afghanistan’s north and south along Highway-1, the ring-shaped road that connects the country, running adjacent to its perimeter. In addition to controlling terrain for some time in Kunduz, Helmand, and Kandahar, the Afghan Taliban is also very capable of striking Kabul.

The Afghan Taliban aims to abort ISIS-Khurasan in its embryonic phase. It has formed a “special forces” contingent of over 1,000 fighters to thwart ISIS-Khurasan. Last year, the Afghan Taliban rescued Hazara Shias kidnapped by Uzbeks claiming ISIS-affiliation and killed their abductors.

Beyond the Afghan Taliban, other state and jihadist forces are working to stop the spread of ISIS in the region.

The U.S. drone campaign in Afghanistan is perhaps more relentless in targeting ISIS-Khurasan operatives than the Afghan Taliban. The campaign seems to have stunted ISIS’s growth, but with little reliable on-the-ground reporting, its full effects are unclear. U.S. drone strikes in ISIS-controlled areas of Afghanistan tend to produce high casualty counts. And that could mean that either ISIS-Khurasan insurgents are being killed in large clusters or significant numbers of civilians are dying along with the militants.

A wide variety of Islamic and Islamist groups in Pakistan have opposed ISIS. Most notable has been the anti-ISIS campaign of JuD, which has intensified after the arrest of some of its former members for joining ISIS. It has launched a sophisticated social media campaign, declaring them as khawarij, using prophetic traditions. The JuD campaign is more than an exercise in damage control. It is a Salafi jihadist group. And there is a real threat of its members defecting to the ISIS camp, especially as LeT remains largely inactive in Kashmir and India, and Islamabad and New Delhi continue their comprehensive dialogue.

What to Look Out For

ISIS’s future prospects in South Asia look dim. Not only has it missed an opportunity to integrate large numbers of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban dissidents into its network, it also has failed to demonstrate the ideological flexibility to make serious inroads in an Islamically heterogeneous South Asia. ISIS demands that those within its network adopt its takfiri variant of Salafism. In contrast, al-Qaeda, which fomented insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan post-9/11, cooperated with Sunni Islamist and jihadist groups that were not Salafi or transnational, realizing its dependence on local actors.

Still, while ISIS lacks state patronage, Afghan intelligence officials may be tempted to use it to hit Pakistan. In the past, Afghan intelligence supported the TTP in its terror campaign in Pakistan. As the Pakistan-based Afghan Taliban continues to strike Afghanistan, ISIS could play, and perhaps already is playing, the same role.

Ten days after militants struck the Indian consulate in Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan on January 3, 2016, ISIS-Khurasan attacked the Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad, with the Indian and Iranian consulates nearby. Within the same hour, terrorists hit the Pakistani city of Quetta, in an attack that claimed by the TTP. ISIS-Khurasan also took responsibility for the attempted targeted killing of Afghan Taliban-linked figure in Peshawar last month; these targeted killings in Pakistan have allegedly been perpetrated by Afghan intelligence in recent years.

Zahir Qadir, an anti-ISIS warlord and Afghan parliamentarian, has alleged that his government is supporting ISIS-Khurasan, pointing toward alleged secret flights transporting militants to his home province of Nangarhar. He also claims that Lashkar-e Islam, an Afghanistan-based Pakistani militant group fighting against Islamabad, is supported by Kabul and provides logistical support to ISIS-Khurasan.

In addition to the potential for covert state patronage, exogenous factors could bolster ISIS in South Asia. Iran has increased its use of Afghan and Pakistani Shia fighters as cannon fodder in Syria. They fight under the Fatemiyoun Brigade. One of its recently slain commanders appears to be a Pashtun Shia from the Kurram Agency, an area that has witnessed all-out sectarian war. The return of these fighters home could upend Sunni-Shia relations in Kurram, creating greater local appeal for the ISIS brand.

In the coming months, ISIS is likely to delineate the boundaries of its Khurasan “province.” Al-Qaeda has excluded Pakistan’s Punjab and Sindh provinces from its conception of Khurasan. Its Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent affiliate has jurisdiction over these provinces, as well as Kashmir, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. ISIS may follow suit and establish a separate administrative unit for this area – a “Wilayat Hind.” But much like its “province” of Khurasan, ISIS-Hind would be an imaginary space than a real stronghold.

Arif Rafiq (@arifcrafiq) is president of Vizier Consulting, LLC, which provides strategic guidance on Middle East and South Asian political and security issues.

#Afghanistan: Woman falsely accused of burning Koran ripped apart by mob

Islam 0

A woman falsely accused of burning a Koran was ripped to pieces by a mob in Afghanistan.  The woman, Farkhunda Malikzada, was falsely accused by a merchant who was selling Viagra and magical pregnancy amulets.

The tormented final hours of Farkhunda Malikzada, a 27-year-old aspiring student of Islam who was [falsely] accused of burning a Quran in a Muslim shrine, shocked Afghans across the country. That is because many of her killers filmed one another beating her and posted clips of her broken body on social media. Hundreds of other men watched, holding their phones aloft to try to get a glimpse of the violence, but never making a move to intervene. Those standing by included several police officers.

At first, the trial and convictions that followed seemed a victory in the long struggle to give Afghan women their due in a court of law. But a deeper look suggests otherwise. The fortuneteller who several investigators believe set the events in motion was found not guilty on appeal. The shrine’s custodian, who concocted the false charge of Quran burning and incited the mob, had his death sentence commuted. Police officers who failed to send help and others who stood by received slaps on the wrist, at most. Some attackers identifiable in the videos avoided capture altogether.

Farkhunda’s death and the legal system’s response call into question more than a decade of Western efforts in Afghanistan to instill a rule of law and improve the status of women. The United States alone has spent more than $1 billion to train lawyers and judges and to improve legal protections for women; European countries have provided tens of millions more.

Do you think these results might have been avoided if we had spent $2 billion instead of only $1 billion?

Farkhunda first visited the Shah-Do Shamshira shrine…. [where she noticed]  the fortuneteller… [selling women] amulets to help them get pregnant, find a husband or have male children. Known as tawiz, the amulets usually consist of writings on a small piece of paper that a woman can pin to her body or keep in a pocket.

Do you think Afghan women would have a higher birthrate if more of them found out the other way of having children?

… the fortuneteller, almost certainly with the assistance of the custodian, was trafficking in Viagra and condoms, said Shahla Farid, a member of the investigating committee set up by President Ashraf Ghani after the murder. Viagra is popular and easily available in Afghanistan.

If Afghan men disproportionally suffer from erectile dysfunction, do the anger and despair that engenders explain why radical Islam is so attractive to them?

When Ms. Malikzada complained about the amulets, the head custodian of Shah-Do spread false rumors that Ms. Malikzada had burned a Koran.  Then the mob beat her to death.

“Then she fell down on the ground and the people tried to beat her and pummel her… They were like kids playing with a sack of flour on the floor.”

In the videos, Farkhunda seems at first to be screaming in pain from the kicks, but then her body convulses under the blows, and soon, she stops moving at all. Even when the mob pulls her into the street and gets a car to run over her, and she is dragged 300 feet, the police stand by.

By then, she was little more than a clothed mass of blood and bones. Yet still more people came to beat her. One of the most fervent was a young man, Mohammad Yaqoub, who worked at an eyeglasses shop. He heard the crowd as Farkhunda was dragged behind the car and rushed out, eager to join. The men had dragged Farkhunda’s body to the riverbank, and Mr. Yaqoub looked for heavy rocks to drop on her. One was so large, he could barely lift it, he said. As Mr. Yaqoub milled with the crowd, other men set Farkhunda on fire[.]

The end result is that there were a few convictions of the mob, and most of those were overturned or reduced on appeal.  None of the police who stood by was substantially punished.

Events at Shah-Do clearly got out of control.  The police should have been mobile immediately, acting as interceptors to stop the mob before they could harm the alienated woman.  Instead, many stood by and did nothing.

This is another reason why we should end all Muslim immigration.  Too many of them believe in this sort of intolerance.  Let’s say she had burned a Koran for real.  That would still be no excuse for beating her to death.  Honor killings, beating of women, clitorectomies with rusty razors, intolerance of other religions – we don’t need more of this in America.

This article was written by Ed Straker, senior writer of NewsMachete.com, the conservative news site.

A woman falsely accused of burning a Koran was ripped to pieces by a mob in Afghanistan.  The woman, Farkhunda Malikzada, was falsely accused by a merchant who was selling Viagra and magical pregnancy amulets.

The tormented final hours of Farkhunda Malikzada, a 27-year-old aspiring student of Islam who was [falsely] accused of burning a Quran in a Muslim shrine, shocked Afghans across the country. That is because many of her killers filmed one another beating her and posted clips of her broken body on social media. Hundreds of other men watched, holding their phones aloft to try to get a glimpse of the violence, but never making a move to intervene. Those standing by included several police officers.

At first, the trial and convictions that followed seemed a victory in the long struggle to give Afghan women their due in a court of law. But a deeper look suggests otherwise. The fortuneteller who several investigators believe set the events in motion was found not guilty on appeal. The shrine’s custodian, who concocted the false charge of Quran burning and incited the mob, had his death sentence commuted. Police officers who failed to send help and others who stood by received slaps on the wrist, at most. Some attackers identifiable in the videos avoided capture altogether.

Farkhunda’s death and the legal system’s response call into question more than a decade of Western efforts in Afghanistan to instill a rule of law and improve the status of women. The United States alone has spent more than $1 billion to train lawyers and judges and to improve legal protections for women; European countries have provided tens of millions more.

Do you think these results might have been avoided if we had spent $2 billion instead of only $1 billion?

Farkhunda first visited the Shah-Do Shamshira shrine…. [where she noticed]  the fortuneteller… [selling women] amulets to help them get pregnant, find a husband or have male children. Known as tawiz, the amulets usually consist of writings on a small piece of paper that a woman can pin to her body or keep in a pocket.

Do you think Afghan women would have a higher birthrate if more of them found out the other way of having children?

… the fortuneteller, almost certainly with the assistance of the custodian, was trafficking in Viagra and condoms, said Shahla Farid, a member of the investigating committee set up by President Ashraf Ghani after the murder. Viagra is popular and easily available in Afghanistan.

If Afghan men disproportionally suffer from erectile dysfunction, do the anger and despair that engenders explain why radical Islam is so attractive to them?

When Ms. Malikzada complained about the amulets, the head custodian of Shah-Do spread false rumors that Ms. Malikzada had burned a Koran.  Then the mob beat her to death.

“Then she fell down on the ground and the people tried to beat her and pummel her… They were like kids playing with a sack of flour on the floor.”

In the videos, Farkhunda seems at first to be screaming in pain from the kicks, but then her body convulses under the blows, and soon, she stops moving at all. Even when the mob pulls her into the street and gets a car to run over her, and she is dragged 300 feet, the police stand by.

By then, she was little more than a clothed mass of blood and bones. Yet still more people came to beat her. One of the most fervent was a young man, Mohammad Yaqoub, who worked at an eyeglasses shop. He heard the crowd as Farkhunda was dragged behind the car and rushed out, eager to join. The men had dragged Farkhunda’s body to the riverbank, and Mr. Yaqoub looked for heavy rocks to drop on her. One was so large, he could barely lift it, he said. As Mr. Yaqoub milled with the crowd, other men set Farkhunda on fire[.]

The end result is that there were a few convictions of the mob, and most of those were overturned or reduced on appeal.  None of the police who stood by was substantially punished.

Events at Shah-Do clearly got out of control.  The police should have been mobile immediately, acting as interceptors to stop the mob before they could harm the alienated woman.  Instead, many stood by and did nothing.

This is another reason why we should end all Muslim immigration.  Too many of them believe in this sort of intolerance.  Let’s say she had burned a Koran for real.  That would still be no excuse for beating her to death.  Honor killings, beating of women, clitorectomies with rusty razors, intolerance of other religions – we don’t need more of this in America.

This article was written by Ed Straker, senior writer of NewsMachete.com, the conservative news site.

Read more: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2015/12/woman_falsely_accused_of_burning_koran_ripped_apart_by_afghan_mob.html#ixzz3vX81W69R
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Afghanistan: Islamic State expands footprint with terror campaign

In this Nov. 29, 2015 photo, an internally displaced girl peeks from a tent after her family left their village in Rodat district of Jalalabad, Afghanistan. Nangarhar’s chief refugee official says that at least 25,200 families, or more than 170,000 people, have been displaced across the province, either by Islamic State or perceived threats from the group. (AP Photo/Rahmat Gul)

JALALABAD, Afghanistan (AP) — Rahman Wali’s younger brother was one of 10 Afghan men forced by Islamic State militants to kneel over bombs buried in the soil in a lush green valley in eastern Nangarhar province. The extremists then detonated the bombs, turning the pastoral countryside into a scene of horror.

The August killings were recorded on camera and posted on social media like so many IS atrocities across the Mideast — reflecting how the Islamic State is exporting its particular brand of cruelty as the group seeks to enlarge its footprint in Afghanistan.

It was through the macabre video that 44-year-old Wali learned the fate of his brother, Rahman Gul, an imam in their remote Shinwar district bordering Pakistan. Gul had been kidnapped weeks earlier, together with his wife and six children who were quickly set free.

After his brother’s death, Wali and his family fled to the provincial capital of Jalalabad, seeking refuge in a makeshift camp with thousands of others who left their homes in the valleys hugging the border to escape what is turning out to be an increasingly vicious war for control of the region between the Taliban and fighters of Afghanistan’s IS affiliate.

Reports of an IS presence in Afghanistan first emerged early this year in southern Helmand province, where recruiters believed to have links to the IS leadership in Syria were killed by a US drone strike in February.

In the summer, extremists pledging allegiance to IS also surfaced in Nangarhar, where they challenged the Taliban in border clashes. After see-sawing between the two groups, four districts — Achin, Nazyan, Bati Kot and Spin Gar — fell under IS control, according to Gen. John F. Campbell, the US commander of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General John F. Campbell speaks during a press conference at Resolute Support headquarters in Kabul on November 25, 2015. (AFP PHOTO/Massoud HOSSAINI/POOL / AFP / POOL / MASSOUD HOSSAINI)

Commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General John F. Campbell speaks during a press conference at Resolute Support headquarters in Kabul on November 25, 2015. (AFP PHOTO/Massoud HOSSAINI/POOL / AFP / POOL / MASSOUD HOSSAINI)

Campbell told The Associated Press in an interview this week that IS loyalists in Afghanistan are now trying to consolidate links to the mothership — the so-called “caliphate” proclaimed on territory IS seized in Syria and Iraq after its blitz there in the summer of 2014.

For the present, IS ambitions for Afghanistan seem focused on setting up what it calls “Khorasan Province,” taking the name of an ancient province of the Persian Empire that included territories in today’s Afghanistan, Iran and some Central Asian states. It parallels names for affiliates elsewhere, such as the IS branch in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, which is known as “Sinai Province.”

“I think ISIL is really trying to establish a base in Nangarhar … and establish Jalalabad as the base of the Khorasan Province,” Campbell said, using an alternative acronym for IS.

Several residents who fled the four Nangarhar districts say IS’s “reign of terror” there includes extortion, evictions, arbitrary imprisonment and forced marriage for young women. Beheadings and killings with “buried bombs” — such as the gruesome slaying of Wali’s brother — are filmed and posted on social media to instill fear, they said. Some spoke on condition of anonymity, fearing reprisals for relatives back in the districts.

Mimicking IS’s media outreach in Syria and Iraq, the Afghan branch also set up a radio station in Nangarhar, “Radio Caliphate,” broadcasting at least one hour a day to attract young Afghan men disenchanted by dim job prospects in a war-torn country with an overall 24 percent unemployment rate. The joblessness is even higher among youths targeted in the IS recruitment drive.

Meanwhile, the Afghan government forces, busy fighting the Taliban elsewhere, left the two militant groups to battle it out.

And battle they did. Hundreds of Taliban fighters — disillusioned with the 14-year war to overthrow the Kabul government — switched allegiance to IS.

Though estimates say that IS fighters number a few thousand nationwide, they are still far outnumbered by the Taliban, who have anywhere between 20,000 to 30,000 in their ranks, according to Afghan political analyst Waheed Muzhdah, who worked in the Taliban foreign ministry during their 1996-2001 rule.

Still, many admit the IS Afghan branch could pose a serious threat to the unstable nation.

In a report released this week, the Pentagon referred to the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant — Khorasan Province” as an “emergent competitor to other violent extremist groups that have traditionally operated in Afghanistan.”

“This may result in increased violence among the various extremist groups in 2016,” the Dec. 16 report said.

Campbell said some foreign IS fighters have joined the Afghans from Iraq and Syria. Former residents said they spotted gunmen from Pakistan and Uzbekistan, as well as Arabic speakers flush with money and apparently better armed than the Taliban.

Nangarhar is attractive to IS for its mix of insurgent groups, some of which are based across the border in Pakistan, and criminal gangs involved in lucrative drugs and minerals smuggling.

Alarm bells rang when students at the prestigious Nangarhar University staged a pro-IS demonstration on campus in August, sparking arrests by the Afghan intelligence agency and a crackdown on universities nationwide.

Governor Salim Kunduzi put IS’s battleground strength in Nangarhar at around 400 fighters. The province’s mountainous terrain provides perfect ground for an insurgency, and militants can easily resupply from Pakistan, he said. The province can also serve as a staging ground for a push north, along the eastern border and eventually on to Kabul, just 125 kilometers (77.5 miles) to the west, he added.

Both Campbell and Kunduzi agree IS may see Jalalabad as its base for expansion in Afghanistan.

“I do not think Daesh will focus only on the east,” Kunduzi said, using the Arabic language acronym for the Islamic State group.

Nangarhar’s chief refugee official, Ghulam Haidar Faqirzai, said that at least 25,200 families — or more than 170,000 people — have been displaced across the province, either directly by IS or by perceived threats from the group. As the winter sets in, needs of the displaced are intensifying, he warned.

In a camp on Jalalabad’s eastern outskirts, 70-year-old Yaqub, who like many Afghan men uses only one name, said he left his village in Maamand Valley in Achin district six months ago, after “fighters of the black flag” — the Islamic State’s banner — dragged him and his son into prison where they were beaten and tortured. He said he still does not know why.

“They covered my head with a black bag so I couldn’t breathe while they beat me for a whole day, and every day they said they were going to kill me,” he said.

Yaqub and his son were released after the family paid their captors 200,000 Pakistani rupees, or almost $2,000 — a fortune in Afghanistan, where the average annual income is around $700.

“Anything is better than going back there,” said Yaqub.

Copyright 2015 The Associated Press.

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